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Number of Reports Since the Last Issue: 21

Report Topics Have Included:
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Near-miss Engine Room Fire
Fatigue
Navigation in Restricted Visibility
Conduct of Vessels Under Oars
Wake Wash Incidents
Unmarked Fishing Gear

REPORTS

REPORTS ARE PUBLISHED ONLY WITH THE AGREEMENT OF THE REPORTER
AND ARE, AS FAR AS POSSIBLE, IN THEIR OWN WORDS, EDITED ONLY TO
REMOVE IDENTIFYING TEXT. THE SAFETY CONCERN(S) RAISED ARE BASED
ON THE INFORMATION PROVIDED BY THE REPORTER AND THEREFORE
REPRESENT THE REPORTER’S PERSPECTIVE.

MERCHANT SHIPPING

NEAR COLLISION

Report Text: Close Encounter with a Dredger

0750 Vessel was on course 012 deg and steaming 6.5 knots in approach to Pilot boarding area.
Sighted and tracked the dredger on bearing 014 deg x 2.35’ off. Approximate course of the dredger was 250 deg, speed 2 knots.

0751 Master ordered Half Ahead and altered course to 020 deg.

0759 Dredger bore 006 deg x 0.7’ off and started turning hard to port to return to her opposite course.

Master ordered engine to Stop. Contacted the dredger but she didn’t respond. Master sounded the air horn to alert the dredger.

0801 Master ordered D/S Astern & Slow Astern. Vessel’s heading was 025 deg with minimum headway.

0802 Ordered Full Astern engine. Sternway was 2 knots at the moment.

0809 Ordered to stop her engine. Vessel’s heading was 065.

0812 Altered course to port to steer 358 with the aid of the bow thruster and proceeded to Pilot boarding area. The dredger continued on her intention and passed about 4 cables on the bow.

Master’s Comment:
The dredger is restricted in her ability to manoeuvre. She’s on approximately SW’ly course so that’s why I altered course to starboard to keep clear of her,

BACK ISSUES

Back issues of MARITIME FEEDBACK are available on our website: www.chirp.co.uk
owing to her state of navigation and have a minimum CPA of 0.7 miles.

Her action in altering course to north-easterly with a huge vessel close on her port side at about 6.5 cables off, does not give her the privilege based on her status to do whatever she wants on situation such as what happened. She can keep on her course or even stop.

She didn’t even bother to inform or advice her intention of her sudden alteration.

She did, however, sent an AIS message to me after I reported the incident to VTS which makes it to say that she is indeed capable of communicating in one way or another, but didn’t do so.

**CHIRP Comment**: This incident was brought to the attention of the port operator with the master’s consent and they responded as follows:

“Please be advised that I have replayed the radar and VHF tapes of the near-miss reported to you....

The dredger was dredging in a defined dredge area (charted) and was (I am advised) displaying the correct lights and shapes for this activity.

Having reviewed the tapes the vessels got no closer than 4 cables apart at any time and in the absence of further evidence I would not intend to investigate this report any further.”

The Maritime Advisory Board nevertheless considers vessels restricted in their ability to manoeuvre should be navigated with a particular awareness of their potential impact on other vessels and not rely entirely on their status. This would involve, as a matter of courtesy at least, keeping other traffic advised of their movements when necessary and attempting to anticipate difficulties, rather than prompting them.

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**BULLYING AND HARASSMENT**

**Report Text**: The incident I have been most shocked by is the bullying by some officers on other crew. I had sailed with a certain Asian 2nd Officer previously and sailed again with him onboard a vessel last winter. The Chief Officer was European and certainly had a chip on his shoulder against what seemed like the whole world. What the world had done against him I’ll never know, but maybe it was just being deep sea for so long. The Asians do 9 month contracts compared to the 3 months by the Europeans - a long time by all standards. The Chief Officer verbally abused the 2nd Officer both privately and publicly - usually over VHF whilst the 2nd Officer was working hard. All the crew would cringe and wince as the foul mouthed insults would fly towards the poor 2nd mate who knew that he could not talk back or his job would be in jeopardy. This continued for 2 months until one day the Chief told him that he thought that he was s**t, had bought his license and was a waste of oxygen. Combined with that he told him that his English was crap (it wasn't because I spoke to him all the time). The Chief smiled as the 2nd mate quit his job and signed off the ship in tears. I was ashamed that day.

The Master was fully aware of the bullying that was occurring on the vessel but chose to turn a blind eye because he “didn’t want to interfere with the Chief Officer” (who was feared even by the Captain). The Captain was a very laid back man who was quiet with all the crew and barely uttered a word to anyone.

**CHIRP Comment**: The reporter took steps to inform the company, but decided to leave the organisation. This is an extreme example of bullying with a potentially devastating impact upon the teamwork required for safe operations.

Bullying and harassment issues are not restricted to European/Asian cultures or exclusive to multi-culture crew complements and are often less overt than the example given above. European guidance on the subject ([www.etf-europe.org](http://www.etf-europe.org)): “All workers have the right to work without suffering harassment and bullying in their workplaces. Unfortunately, there are many workers who do not enjoy this basic freedom. It is the responsibility of all employers to ensure that all forms of harassment and bullying of workers are eliminated from their workplaces. It is also the responsibility of trade unions and workers to make sure that harassment and bullying do not take place.”

“Although, in a minority of cases, those committing acts of harassment and bullying do so intentionally, in many cases there are actions which could be classed as harassment and/or bullying that are carried out unwittingly and result from outdated management styles as opposed to any deliberate malign intention. Hence, the adoption and encouragement of management styles that do not involve aggressive and intimidating behaviours would also make an important contribution to the eradication of workplace harassment and bullying.”

The document quotes evidence provided by NUMAST suggesting these issues are underreported and Confidential reporting programmes such as CHIRP are intended to help address the incident/reporting gap by providing the industry with better information about safety related human factors incidents and a means for concerns to be raised confidentially.

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**LIFEBOAT MANUALS**

**Report Text**: Recently one of our ships had a potentially serious accident when the lifeboat securing hooks released under load causing the boat to fall. The manufacturers immediately blamed the crew for not reading the instruction manual properly before they last attached the hooks to the lifeboat
falls. Another gripe (no pun intended) I have about lifeboats is that they are just too complicated for ordinary seafarers to use. Even I, who took a university honours degree in Nautical Studies, find the manuals confusing. Lifeboats are responsible for killing more seafarers during practice than they save in emergencies these days (this is not a figure I can prove but I’m sure I’m correct). The manufacturers expect and require that seafarers read and understand every page of their instruction manuals before they launch a lifeboat, even in an emergency.

**CHIRP** Comment: The poor standard of some manuals has been raised repeatedly through reports to CHIRP. Accidents associated with lifeboats are reported too frequently (see following report) and a lack of familiarity with the equipment is often a factor.

Good, clear instructions in a standard format could go some way to improving matters for seafarers who transfer between different equipment types. Icon based manuals using 500 word vocabularies have been written for complex military equipment, so why can’t something comparable be developed for merchant ships?

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**LIFEBOAT/RESCUE BOAT SURVEYS**

We had a 5yr inspection by Class and we passed all items, including CO₂, fire plan, extinguishers, load testing of cranes, etc, etc, but we had a problem with the freefall boat and the rescue boat.

The first problem was due to the stern lines being in the way of the freefall lifeboat, but the Class surveyor wanted to lower the boat to see if the system was working properly. We eased the tension on the stern ropes to do this, but the vessel moved off the berth. After many attempts to lower the freefall boat the surveyor agreed we should conduct the test on another occasion with the vessel at anchor and send him photographs.

The second problem I had was when we tried to lower the rescue boat, because we were due to shift along the berth to load one of the after hatches and the inspector was therefore pushed to do the load test on the rescue boat’s hook ASAP.

As soon as we finished shifting the vessel the Bosun proceeded to lower the rescue boat to the quayside. The winch had a release handle in the boat for lowering to the sea and also an on-load release hook. After starting to lower the boat, the Bosun noticed that it was lowering faster than was usual with other types of lifeboat and stopped lowering suddenly. This action made the boat jump and the hook released, falling down about 10m, breaking the keel and damaging the hull; fortunately the Bosun escaped without serious injury.

I hope you can see the problems that may arise from drills and the many kinds of inspections, especially when lowering lifeboats. Many seamen are injured, but not reported.

**CHIRP** Comment: This report was sent to the UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) and the International Association for Classification Societies for comment. The Maritime Advisory Board is grateful to both organisations for providing detailed responses and wishes to highlight the following extracts; first from the MCA:

“IMO MSC/Circ.1093 provides guidance for surveyors on the requirements of SOLAS regulation III/20 - Operational readiness, maintenance and inspections; and SOLAS regulation III/36 - Instructions for on-board maintenance.

From the reported comments regarding the lowering of the boats, it would appear that this was carried out in a rushed manner. Drills of this type should be conducted methodically under full control, following a crew briefing in accordance with established shipboard procedures approved under the company ISM system. The surveyor and company representative, if present, should ideally be in attendance at this briefing so that all persons involved in the drill are aware of the procedures to be adopted.”

And from IACS:

“SOLAS regulation III/19, requires that freefall lifeboats are tested in freefall mode to the water once every three months. However, this testing requirement may be extended to six months if every three months the boat is lowered into the water with either a crane or a portal frame. Flag Administrations may allow the freefall mode test to be extended up to 12 months provided the boat is lowered into the water every three months and in addition, a simulated launch takes place every six months. This simulation generally comprises releasing the boat on “hanging off” straps so as to test the operation of the release mechanism.

There are some Flags who will allow dispensations up to 12 months if certain conditions are met such as crew training in a freefall boat at a recognised centre.”

Neither response dealt with the issue of photographs being used to provide the objective evidence required for a Special Survey; is this acceptable? More reports on surveys in general and lifeboats in particular are welcome.

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**SECURITY/EMERGENCY ESCAPE CONFLICT**

Report Text: The Pilot Cabin on this ship is at the top of the internal stairs, aft of the chartroom. If there were an accommodation fire, a person using the cabin would not be able to get out on the outside deck and would almost certainly die. A person could not exit through the chartroom.
because the ISPS code requires bridge spaces to be locked in port. The porthole on the cabin is probably too small for a person to get through and is secured by nuts and bolts all round i.e. no "dogs"; hence it is impossible to open it. Even if someone were able to smash the port glass, he would be badly lacerated trying to get through.

**CHIRP** Comment: This report was sent to the vessel operator with some suggestions from the CHIRP Maritime Advisory Board and they responded as follows:

"We appreciate the feedback provided and have just now concluded the investigation. After carefully assessing the security and safety risks, we have made a provision to install a "break in case of emergency" type box with the wheelhouse key inside in the Pilot’s cabin. We agree with your comments that this would resolve both the security and safety issues."

The Maritime Advisory Board wishes to emphasise the focus of the ISPS Code is to prevent unauthorised access to the ship and there are a number of ways in which this can be achieved without restricting emergency exits e.g. internal bolts, turnbuckles, etc.

The SOLAS regulations are also clear with respect to the priority of safety over security and state at Chapter XI-2 Reg. 8(2):

"If, in the professional judgement of the master, a conflict between any safety and security requirements applicable to the ship arises during its operations, the master shall give effect to those requirements necessary to maintain the safety of the ship...."

The master may implement temporary security measures whilst the security/safety conflict is resolved with its Administration and, if appropriate, the Contracting Government in whose port the ship is operating or intends to enter.

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**Too Many Drills, Not Enough Time?**

**Report Text:** I, and I am sure many other masters, now have to use a large proportion of time previously allocated to such important training to undertake security drills required by the ISPS Code and anti-pollution training required, in particular by the United States. The old "board of trade sports day" once given for LSA/FFA training is no longer enough to cover all these issues and the time has come for legislators to require shipowners to set aside a proportion of seafarers working time to undertake everything which is now necessary. Most union agreements with shipowners still require such periods of training to be "unpaid" which is not fair when one considers that a realistic allocation of a seafarer's time for all training requirements would be in excess of 4 hours.

Unless the proper amount of time is allocated for each of these important issues, we should not expect seafarers to become proficient in any particular skill such as lifeboat handling.

**CHIRP** Comment: The Maritime Advisory Board believed this issue might best be addressed by a Flag Administration and therefore asked the UK’s Maritime and Coastguard Agency to comment. They responded as follows:

"Whilst the frequency of traditional drills such as emergency and muster drills are and remain regulated the evolving safety culture has with time introduced additional drills and training requirements some of which are ship/type specific and others which are more generic in nature, e.g. rescue from an enclosed space drills, pollution drills etc. In parallel the practice of setting prescriptive regulation has shifted somewhat towards that of fostering safety through a goal setting approach with the onus placed on the owner/operator using safety management tools such as the ISM Code and ongoing safety training.

In the past neither the time allocated to training and drills, nor the content of the drills has been specified; this being left to the judgement of the Masters in light of the competence and experience of the officers and crew on the vessel at the time. Also given the shift in emphasis, the diverse nature of onboard training coupled with the wide variety of ship types and size, crew numbers etc. it is not realistic to prescribe the duration of drills or the time set aside for training.

In a well found ship it would be expected that there is some form of training/drift schedule as part of the ISM system that is specific to the requirements of that ship or type of ship. This would be supplemented with guidance on the maximum time between drills and the type or nature of the exercise/training. Post drill de-briefs and positive feedback should then indicate whether the training needs have been met or alternatively indicate where improvements need to be considered and/or whether additional time or frequency needs to be allocated to that area of training."

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**FISHING**

**Too *@!* Close!**

**Report Text:** Incident with frigate coming up channel from the south-west, speed, not sure, say 15 kts; missed us by no more than 20 yards.

We were hauling our nets near a wreck when we noticed a naval vessel coming towards us (not uncommon). When it didn't alter I called at least three times on Ch 16 (Frigate heading for white hulled fishing vessel, alter to starboard now), no response. After I knew name I called again (it missed), no response. Only when I shouted...
Coastguard did they interject. They did stop for some fifteen minutes afterwards. I said a few things on sixteen I probably shouldn’t have and anyone listening would have been in no doubt that an incident had occurred.

**CHIRP** Comment: After discussions with CHIRP the Reporter decided to talk to the MAIB, who took the matter up with the UK’s Royal Navy. The RN had already conducted its own investigation and taken steps to prevent recurrence. The Reporter was advised of the outcome and was pleased that the incident had been taken seriously.

CHIRP believes safety is in the interest of all those participating in any maritime activity and is promoted by the open and honest reporting and investigation of incidents such as this.

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**LEISURE**

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**A VERY CLOSE CALL**

**Report Text:** We (yacht) were sailing, aux. engine working, helping a bit. A fishing vessel (ID No. supplied) approached on our port side; not fishing, full speed, booms up. This vessel was on a collision course. We still think we had right of the way. The fishing vessel made no attempt to alter course. 50m before colliding he suddenly lowered his booms, thus giving himself the excuse of running into us “in a legal way”! We turned hard to port and missed him by less than 15 meters. The fisherman did not reduce speed, indicating he was still not fishing. Her skipper watched us from his cabin...

We know we must stay away from fishermen at work; they alter course unpredictably, sail on auto-helm and do not answer VHF calls. BUT....

1) This one was not fishing
2) This one had no intention whatsoever to alter course
3) This one did nothing to avoid collision
4) What’s worse: he deliberately decided to have his way
5) This one realised the consequences of people getting killed
6) By lowering his booms he tried to provide himself an argument to tell the judge: “I was fishing, sorry!”
7) We call this a murder attempt. My wife was resting inside. Had I been making coffee, he would have killed us in cold blood.

If you decide that we did have right of the way, we aim to contact the police and charge this fisherman. However, I can’t see what you could do to prevent situations as described. Both parties carry “Rules to Prevent Collisions” onboard.

**CHIRP** Comment: There are a number of points of interest in this non-UK account. Firstly the incident involves a yacht which is motor-sailing (without showing the signals required by Rule 25(e)) and a “fishing” vessel which is not fishing; so, despite any appearance to the contrary, we are discussing an incident involving two power driven vessels approaching each other in a standard Rule 15 crossing situation.

The “fishing” vessel should have given way to the “sailing” vessel and should, so far as possible, have taken early and substantial action to keep well clear (Rule 16). The failure to do so in the reported circumstances was a clear contravention of the Rules. There is correspondingly a doubt as to whether the risk of collision was assessed in accordance with the requirements of Rule 7.

The lowering of the booms by the give-way vessel may have been an attempt to indicate she was fishing or may have been in preparation for fishing, but in any event she was the give-way vessel.

The “sailing” vessel was correct to keep her course and speed, but may have taken action to avoid collision by her manoeuvre alone, as soon as it became apparent to her that the vessel required to keep out of the way was not taking appropriate action in compliance with the Rules (Rule 17(a) (i) (ii)). The opportunity to act provided by the Rules does not appear to have been considered or taken.

If early action is taken by a “stand-on” vessel, it should, if the circumstances of the case admit, not involve an alteration of course to port for a vessel on her own port side (Rule 17(c)).

The “sailing” vessel found herself so close that collision could not be avoided by the action of the give-way vessel alone, and she took such action as was considered the best aid to avoid collision (Rule 17(b)) and this was fortunately successful.

As a final point, the Maritime Advisory Board would like to endorse and remind mariners of their obligations under Rule 5:

“Every vessel shall at all times maintain a proper look-out by sight and hearing as well as by all available means appropriate in the prevailing circumstances and conditions so as to make a full appraisal of the situation and of the risk of collision.”

Those below will have to make their own coffee!

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**PASSAGE PLANNING**

**Report Text:** I consider myself to be an experienced Skipper and racer, but would like to share an experience I had a little while ago whilst on passage from St Peter’s Port to Torbay in a 10m yacht with 8 persons onboard.

We arrived in St Peter’s Port after having competed in a race from the Solent. The race instructions
included a passage through The Needles, leaving the Casquettes to port. I programmed the GPS with a clearing or safety waypoint to the NW of the rocks and we had an exhilarating and largely uneventful race.

After spending some time in St Peter's Port we departed for Torbay, in ideal conditions, with a southerly wind of 10-12 kts, warm fine weather and good visibility. The passage plan involved passing the Casquettes again.

We'd had a good, but hard week of racing and this seemed like a good time to catch up on some sleep, so shortly after sunset, with the boat making excellent progress, I briefed the watch, checked we were on course for the Casquettes waypoint and turned in.

The next thing I knew I was being shaken awake by a very alarmed crewmember. I was quickly up in the cockpit and was greeted by the sound of water breaking on rocks and, looking up, I could see the Casquettes light. We managed to turn away to port and narrowly missed disaster.

When we'd all calmed down, the reason we found ourselves in that situation became clear; I was still using the Casquettes waypoint programmed for the southbound passage. To make this waypoint northbound actually took us over the rocks!

Safety waypoints are often programmed into a GPS, but have to be checked to ensure they are still appropriate for each passage.”

**CHIRP Comment:** The Maritime Advisory Board wishes to commend this reporter for his honesty in sharing this experience and hopes it will stimulate more individuals to do the same in the interest of improving marine safety.

The passage planning, execution and monitoring lessons to be learned from this incident apply to all mariners.

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**EDITORIAL**

As CHIRP approaches its second birthday, it will soon be reassessed to determine whether it continues deliver information of value to the industry. If you have a view on this matter, please share it with us.

This seventh edition of FEEDBACK contains an interesting mixed bag of reports; some shared with operators and others provided for information with industry comment. Recognising the importance of near-miss reports CHIRP always tries to squeeze as much value from them as possible, consistent with protecting the identity of the source, where this is required by the reporter.

CHIRP’s channelling of information to organisations capable of addressing and/or developing particular concerns prior to publication differentiates it from any other confidential programme currently available.

To find out how much assistance CHIRP can be with your concern, contact us. Nothing will be done with your report without your consent.

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**REPORT UPDATE**

**UNMARKED FISHING GEAR**

We have recently learned of an initiative to mitigate the risks posed by unmarked or poorly marked fishing gear in the area of the Solent falling within the responsibility of ABP Southampton and are pleased to reproduce these comments provided by Mike Evans, Deputy Harbour Master:

“During the summer of 2004 the Harbour Authority (ABP Southampton) was made aware that there were a large number of fishing marks being laid in certain areas of the port area which were not properly marked and were causing a hazard to surface navigation, particularly to small craft.

At the same time the RYA contacted us regarding this issue as they were also receiving reports of problems in this area, as well as in many areas around the UK coastline.

There is a port Byelaw, which prohibits the placing of nets or other fishing gear in areas where they are likely to become an obstruction and the Harbour Authority thus took action to remove as many of the poorly marked buoys as possible.

However, it soon became apparent, that this problem could not be effectively addressed with the blunt application of the byelaws and the harbour Authority had no real wish to see fishermen’s livelihoods adversely affected if another solution could be found.

A series of meetings ensued between ABP Southampton, the RYA and the local fishermen together with the River Hamble Harbour Authority who had an interest in this as the majority of the fishermen are based on the Hamble.

After several meetings agreement was reached on the basis that if the fishing gear was effectively marked and laid in defined areas, the Harbour Authority would not pursue the matter under its Byelaws and the local recreational community could be advised of the arrangements via a Local Notice to Mariners.

At the time of writing the Harbour Authority has received positive feedback from recreational users that the fishing gear is now clearly marked and lit. No complaints about fishermen’s gear have been received since the new regime commenced.”

Similar cooperative initiatives in other high risk locations between fishermen and local harbour authorities, effectively implemented should be encouraged. Details of the scheme, contained in a Local Notice to Mariners (17/2005), may be obtained from [www.southamptonvts.co.uk](http://www.southamptonvts.co.uk).
The following accidents/incidents are being investigated by the MAIB as at 06 June 2005: MAIB reports are available on their website www.maib.gov.uk

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<td>Collision between two container ships off S.Korea.</td>
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<td>Loss of fishing vessel off Talisker, Isle of Skye. One death confirmed—possibility of one further fatality.</td>
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<td>Dorthe Dalose/Scot Explorer</td>
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<td>Stolt Tern</td>
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<td>Jann Denise II</td>
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<td>Amenity/Tor Dania</td>
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<td>Bro Traveller/ Island Gem</td>
<td>Collision between chemical tanker and bulk carrier in the Bristol Channel</td>
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<td>Grounding of general cargo vessel off Aarhus, Denmark.</td>
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<td>Bounty</td>
<td>Capsize of Teignmouth registered fishing vessel Bounty, resulting in loss of vessel.</td>
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**CONTACT US**

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**CHIRP**

**MARITIME REPORT FORM**

CHIRP is entirely independent of any other organisation involved in the maritime sector, whether regulatory, operational, manufacturer or supplier.

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>NAME:</th>
<th>ADDRESS:</th>
<th>POST CODE: TEL:</th>
<th>DO YOU HAVE A PREFERRED DATE AND/OR METHOD FOR CHIRP TO CONTACT YOU?:</th>
</tr>
</thead>
</table>

1. This report will only be seen by CHIRP staff.
2. Your personal details are required only to enable us to contact you for further details about any part of your report.
3. You will receive an acknowledgement as soon as possible.
4. This Report Form will be returned to you or destroyed.

No record of your name and address will be kept. The report will not be used without your approval.

**PLEASE COMPLETE THE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>YOURSELF - CREW POSITION</th>
<th>THE VESSEL</th>
<th>Type of Voyage</th>
<th>Type of Operation</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Master</td>
<td>Date of Occurrence</td>
<td>Ocean Passage</td>
<td>Commercial Transport</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Chief Engineer</td>
<td>Time (LOCAL/GMT)</td>
<td>Coastal</td>
<td>Offshore</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Deck Rating</td>
<td>Location:</td>
<td>Other</td>
<td>Fishing</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Catering</td>
<td>At Sea</td>
<td>In Port</td>
<td>Leisure</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>(Other (Hotel, etc))</td>
<td></td>
<td>Other</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>EXPERIENCE / QUALIFICATION</th>
<th>WEATHER</th>
<th>VOYAGE PHASE</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Total Years</td>
<td>Wind Force</td>
<td>Pre-Dptoration</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Years on Type</td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Arrival/Pilotage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Certificate Grade</td>
<td>Sea Height</td>
<td>Unmooring</td>
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<tr>
<td></td>
<td>Direction</td>
<td>Mooring</td>
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<tr>
<td>PEC</td>
<td>Smell Height</td>
<td>Departure/Pilotage</td>
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<tr>
<td>Other Qualifications</td>
<td>Visibility</td>
<td>Loading</td>
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<td>Rain</td>
<td>Transit</td>
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<tr>
<td>Fog</td>
<td>Snow</td>
<td>Discharging</td>
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<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>THE COMPANY</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>NAME OF COMPANY:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>DESIGNATED PERSON ASHORE (OR CONTACT PERSON)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>TEL:</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>FAX:</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**ACCOUNT OF EVENT** *(Please describe the event, why it resulted or could have resulted in an incident and what might be done to prevent it happening again. Please continue on additional sheets if necessary)*

Please place the completed report form, with additional pages if required, in a sealed envelope (no stamp required) and send to:

CHIRP • FREEPOST (GI3439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • Hampshire • GU14 8BR • UK

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