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Maritime Reports received in Period: 21

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NEAR GROUNDING
The duty officer had been giving the trainee helmsman steering practice. On approaching the pilotage area he made the initial report to port control giving ships details at the same time as telling the trainee helmsman to change back to auto-pilot. He did not observe the changeover and the trainee switched to bridge wing control on the 3 position switch.

The duty officer was making a logbook entry by then. It was observed that the ship was swinging off towards a drying bank ¾' distant at full ahead (16 knots). When the officer was made aware of what was happening, he just said “No steering” and took no further action.

The “con” was taken from the duty officer and both engines put full astern, before investigating the steering using a torch.

The duty officer expressed the view that the ship could not go astern as the vessel was on shaft generator. However, this is not so and indeed the vessel did not black out.

The duty officer was asked to inform the master and call an anchor party and the engine room to start a generator, none of which he did.

It was found that the steering selector switch was on “bridge wing”; the steering was put back to hand and the cadet on the wheel.

The vessel was by now less than 1 cable from the bank and just about stopped. She managed to steer away, helm hard over and resume towards the buoyed channel. Once things had calmed down we discussed the incident.

The duty officer did not want the Master to find out, he thought he would be sacked and blacklisted by the crewing agency and not be able to find work again....

The duty officer was also made aware that this incident and the failure to follow correct procedures was hardly teaching the trainee the correct way to behave when he ultimately qualifies.

The Reporter believed this incident should be reported to the operational management and, after the Maritime Advisory Board reviewed the incident, agreed to the depersonalised account being shared with the MAIB.

The MAIB will, of course, accept such reports on a confidential basis itself.

The report has been forwarded to the operational management for their assessment, highlighting the procedural, bridge resource management and familiarisation issues.

SAFETY ON SAFETY CRAFT
This report concerns 12m fast patrol craft which are employed under a contract requiring them to operate in conditions up to Douglas Sea State 5 i.e. waves up to 4m. These boats were purchased as replacements without consulting the people involved. The boats are not bad, but they are not suitable for sustained operations in a 4m sea and crew have been injured. The defects include the pneumatic seats bottoming out in rough weather and insufficient hand holds.

Despite being certificated under the Small Craft Code by a Classification Society, it turned out, when checked by someone else, that the boats don’t comply. Having said that no modifications could be made which would enable the boats to operate in the contracted sea state.

Management have acknowledged complaints and have agreed to make incidental changes, but their position is complicated by the fact that the contract contains penalties for the times the boats are not operating and the crew feel under pressure to operate in conditions which the boats are not suitable for.
The contracted sea state should be, at maximum 4 and
more appropriately 3 on the Douglas Scale.

This report involved CHIRP fielding a considerable
amount of correspondence. The safety issues had
become complicated to a greater or lesser extent by a
number of factors including the certification of the
boats.

During the correspondence it became evident that a
procedure existed within the company safety
management system allowing the Master of the craft to
declare himself weather bound (thus potentially
mitigating the injury risk).

The Maritime Advisory Board in reviewing the issues
raised put the arguments about the suitability and
certification of the craft aside and focussed on this
procedure which proved to be the key to resolving the
safety concern.

The company restated in writing that safety was
paramount and the procedure was subsequently
operated successfully over the winter period.

The company also made an undertaking to review the
wording of the "Weather Bound Procedure" to ensure
it was understood by all that commercial considerations
should not adversely influence safety imperatives at any
time.

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LANGUAGE OF OPERATING AND MAINTENANCE
MANUALS

Having spent the greater part of my life at sea, some 40
years, of which 20 years was as master of anchor
handlers, I am now employed ashore as a technical
consultant for a shipping company.

The Company are presently constructing their first
vessel. My main activity is to train all personnel ready for
when the vessel is delivered and commences a long term
charter.

Your article 'Operating and Maintenance Manuals' was
of particular interest because, as is normal, all equipment
for the new build both major and minor will be delivered
with operating and maintenance manuals; what is very
disturbing is that they will only be in English, one
company has been approached regarding this subject and
will not budge, only English. Even when pressed for
perhaps at least the major items, including the main
engine and safety items they would not budge, not even
for the fire detection system.

Other manufacturers were approached individually and
most would not change their stance. There was one
exception, a manufacturer, who was preparing
instructions in the language of the crew and asked us to
proof read the manual which we happily did and
consequently have the manual for one piece of very
important equipment in the language of the future
operators.

It is for this reason that I cannot agree with the writer
who stated 'I believe that targeting manufacturers for
fault re: operating and maintenance manuals is not
correct'.

CHIRP has been making progress with these issues in
discussion with the International Association of
Classification Societies and others. Amongst the
questions being asked are:

Would standard formats for manuals facilitate training
and reduce the potential for errors?

Should manuals be incorporated in the certification
process (as in aviation)?

And now in addition:

How should language requirements be accommodated?

The CHIRP Maritime Advisory Board remains
confident there are practical answers to all of these
questions and welcomes further contributions.

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SAFE SPEED

While travelling recently as a passenger on a fast ferry the
Master announced vessel would be entering fog and the
tug signal would be heard (do not be alarmed, etc...). I
observed from the numerous GPS displays of position,
course and speed throughout the vessel, no reduction in
speed was made. Vessel maintained approx 42 kts.
Small vessels would have had no chance to avoid
catastrophic collision. We were lucky that night - I think!

CHIRP’s Maritime Advisory Board considered this
report and a full response from the high speed ferry
operator; a “disidentified” extract of which is
reproduced below.

“…..following investigation into the circumstances of the
sailing concerned we are happy to make the following
response.

Unfortunately the white box of the vessels Voyage Data
Recorder only maintains records for 21 days so a full
examination of the data from this equipment was not
possible, other records including the logbook and
electronic chart system were however consulted.

The vessel sailed with the company's most senior Master
in command. The Chief Officer was also very
experienced with significant command experience prior
to joining the company. The bridge team was completed
by the Chief Engineer and initially one and then two
lookouts providing back up to the Master.

Two ARPA equipped radars operating on the 3cm and
10 cm bands and specifically designed for operation of
High Speed Craft with increased scanner rotation speed
were continually in use and monitored by the Master
and the Chief Officer. In the conditions encountered on
the night concerned these radars can track small craft
(without radar reflectors) at over 4 nautical miles and can
easily pick up fishing floats and seabirds. Compared to
this the vessels stopping distance from 42 knots is 480m and turning radius at full speed is 495m.

The weather conditions had been fine with wind light and negligible swell and when the vessel left port there was little cloud and good visibility, during the voyage however patches of reduced visibility were observed and then encountered from 2230 onwards interspersed with periods of good visibility, a suitable warning for passengers was made when it was assessed that sound signals would therefore be required.

Vessel procedures (Extract below: Ed) in accordance with detailed Risk Assessments and in compliance with guidance recommended by MCA and MAIB were implemented. ..... It has been verified by questioning that the procedures were implemented in full....

**Speech: An assessment of the appropriate "Safe Speed".**

The nature of the vessel her manoeuvrability and the radar AIS and electronic chart systems fitted to the vessel may be taken into account when assessing the requirements of Rule 6 with respect to safe speed.

As the visibility reduces so the advantages enjoyed by HSC in this respect to an extent reduce and the likelihood of needing to reduce speed increases reflecting the requirement for the vessel to be able to take proper and effective action to avoid collision and be stopped within a distance appropriate to the prevailing circumstances.

The vessels can be crash stopped from 42 knots in 480m (2.6 cables) in under a minute and can turn through 90 degrees in 495m (2.7 cables) in a similar period of time. It is considered therefore that in normal circumstances it is appropriate to proceed at normal operational speed in visibility down to 5 cables.

With respect to visibility less than 5 cables a reduction in speed would normally be necessary unless ALL the following aspects are satisfactory.

(In considering the extent and appropriateness of any speed reduction the need to avoid the generation of excessive wash/wake in sensitive areas (and consequently speeds between 12 and 30 knots) must also to be considered):

1) Bridge team properly closed up and briefed.
2) Both radars working to maximum efficiency (such that small contacts being tracked at appropriate range)
3) Traffic situation carefully assessed, especially concentration of small craft and whether appropriate CPAs are achievable.
4) Navigational situation reassessed and appropriate iaw Operational Manual.

I am satisfied that in the circumstances pertaining on the night in question the decisions made by the Master and his bridge team were appropriate in that all the above situations were duly considered.

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**The adequacy of procedures is a matter for individual companies based on their own assessments; however the Maritime Advisory Board does make the following observations:**

1. **The UK’s MAIB continues to investigate accidents where incorrect assessments of safe speed have been made in restricted visibility and has made recommendations to the UK Maritime and Coastguard Agency to produce additional guidance on the subject (The MAIB does not produce guidance itself).**

2. **The Maritime and Coastguard Agency guidance is expected in the near future, however in the interim Masters are reminded of their responsibility to make full assessments based on the prevailing circumstances and conditions.**

3. **Whilst full use should be made of the capabilities of electronic systems Bridge Teams should be aware of the risks of over confidence in the equipment.**

4. **Bridge Teams are also reminded to consider how much time they require to assess situations and decide upon appropriate actions when considering a safe speed. This may be particularly relevant in the case of High Speed Craft (HSC).**

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**PEC (PILOTAGE EXEMPTION CERTIFICATES)**

I work for a company on a European ferry service. We have a number of sailings daily, all with PEC holders. In the name of saving a few pennies the company are now rushing through as many masters and mates as possible to obtain their PEC.

As a major port user I'm sure considerable pressure is being put on the Port Authority to pass these guys with absolute minimum tripping requirements, rather than examining their actual ability. I've also heard rumours that special allowance is made for their lack of ability in English.

The requirements for the port are six voyages in and six voyages out to sit an area. As a comparison, a Zeebrugge PEC requires 24 trips in and out to hold and Zeebrugge is an easier port!

There have been several incidents in recent months among our PEC’s of touching bottom, close quarters situations and near misses with berths which can be put down to:

1. Insufficient tripping experience
2. Failure to make allowance for leeway on bends/tide
3. Failure to proceed at a safe speed
4. Little consideration to under keel clearance/adjusting ETA at the bar accordingly
5. Lack of comprehension of English
6. The over use of VHF as a means of navigation.
CHIRP's Maritime Advisory Board acknowledges the different interests involved in this area of port operation and their views, but focuses on the requirements of the Pilotage Act 1987 and will continue to raise concerns in support of port marine safety management systems.

This report was forwarded to the port concerned for their assessment. A disidentified extract from their response is reproduced below:

The allegation that the port issues PEC with minimal tripping and no examination is wholly unfounded. Oral examination, practical assessment by a Class 1 pilot, interview with a Harbour Master, briefing in port operations, assessment of competency and medical certification, and a check on English language ability, all contribute to documented procedures which are embedded within our navigational Safety Management System and ISO 9000 accreditation. These requirements are published in our Pilotage Directions. PECs are only authorised by the Licensing Committee, which comprises executive and non-executive members of the Board. In the matter of PEC administration, the port exceeds the requirements of the DfT Guide to Good Practice.

Readers may be aware that the Maritime and Coastguard Agency (MCA) is about to sign a Memorandum of Understanding (MoU) with the Department for Transport's Ports Division which sets out their respective responsibilities for policy, management and administration of port safety work and more specifically the Port Marine Safety Code and the accompanying Guide to Good Practice.

The MoU lists the Agency’s responsibilities and includes, amongst others:

“Day to day monitoring of standards in port; specifically do ports maintain the standards they have set out in their Safety Management Systems,...” and

“Operational follow up that might arise from:

1. MAIB reports.
2. MCA Surveyor's report.
3. From other parties....”

CHIRP looks forward to continuing to support ports and additionally the efforts of the MCA in fulfilling their responsibilities under the MoU.

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HAVE YOU GOT A LIGHT BUOY?

I am saddened to see that it appears to be only those who sail in the more popular parts of the seas surrounding our coastline who bother to take the time to report poorly marked fishing gear. I also note that reports feature "buoys" encountered in daylight! Yes I do know that it is more difficult in the dark, but it is also more of a problem in the dark as well.... On 21st November (when Johnny and the boys were busy wrestling the rugby world cup from the Aussies) my friend and I sailed from AAA at midnight to deliver my boat to BBB prior to being sold.

It was a dark night with a clear atmosphere and we followed the coastline for the entire 40 miles. All went well until the 0400 watch change when I rose to find my watchman standing like a guardsman at the stern with a grip of steel on the tiller. He told me he had just missed a five gallon drum making approximately four knots into the tide! Couple this with our six knots through the water and you have a converging speed of ten knots which is very fast in the pitch dark. If it had not been for the loom from the land lights of CCC he would not have had time to take avoiding action. The drum was not drifting nor was it marking any crab pots, as the potting season was long passed ending for the year. We can only assume that it was marking an underwater obstruction or a diver's find!

What is the solution to this nightmare situation, apart from slowing to a standstill or waiting till daylight and the attendant weather change?

Each Skipper needs to make a careful assessment of the planned voyage and the risks likely to be encountered. Mitigating these risks may well involve making the most of available daylight.

Within port limits reports should be sent to the Competent Harbour Authority. For the situation outside port limits, CHIRP forwarded the report to the MCA, asking them to describe in what respects they might be able to assist:

“The MCA recognises the difficulties that vessels, particularly smaller yachts and pleasure vessels, may encounter with unmarked gear or floating, semi submerged objects. The MCA has issued advice regarding the Marking of Fishing Gear to Fishermen and the same advice is available to other boat owners. The MCA has also issued advice regarding passage planning for Pleasure Craft (SOLAS V for Pleasure Craft), and advice on what action should be taken if they encounter an object which may be considered to be a hazard to navigation. Both advice leaflets are available form the MCA upon request.

The MCA is aware that floating debris at sea can range between large objects e.g. containers, logs, derelict craft, etc to smaller objects e.g. crates, boxes, branches, leisure items (ililos), etc. More alarmingly, some of these objects can be semi-submerged e.g. containers and nets. Other obstructions can consist of poorly or unmarked devices tethered to submerged objects.

MCA (HM Coastguard) does, from time to time, receive reports of the more dangerous debris eg containers, large logs, derelict craft and will make a radio broadcast to shipping of the type and position and then include it in their routine Maritime Safety Information broadcasts.
usually as a formal WZ Navigation Warning (it will have been reported to the Hydrographer to achieve this). MCA does not have a responsibility or duty to collect or remove debris from the sea unless it is a danger to the environment e.g. drums of chemicals, containers known to contain chemicals or other noxious substances, etc. However, if the objects present a specific danger to navigation e.g. semi-submerged containers in restricted waters, large diameter rope, etc. then it may use its own assets e.g. MCA Emergency Towing Vessels to recover such objects to a place of safety." The action taken by the MCA is based on risk on a case by case basis.

CALL FOR INFORMATION

MOBILE TELEPHONES

CHIRP has recently received information related to the effect of mobile telephones on bridge equipment and other control systems. Some of the information is anecdotal, some taken from the press and some from other transport modes.

The information currently available has been forwarded to the MCA for evaluation, but CHIRP would like to hear from individuals or organisations that have:
1. Witnessed or received reports of mobile telephones effecting navigation or control systems;
2. Adopted firm policies for the control of mobile telephone use on their vessels and on what basis i.e. whether because of interference with equipment or some other reason such as interference with lookout.
3. Any other issues related to the use of mobile telephones.

All responses will of course be treated confidentially.

FIRST YEAR REPORT

Maritime CHIRP celebrated its first year in operation on 1st July, so it’s appropriate to review the last twelve months.

At the time of writing there are seventy-five reports in the database. Of those, forty-two have been forwarded to other organisations for evaluation/action.

Many of the reports have resulted in positive action being taken and all have raised awareness of particular issues or perspectives. Some reports have been relatively straightforward and others more complicated. For a number of reports the identified issues have been resolved by the relevant organisation and others are still being assessed, including amongst others:
- VTS
- Safety Management System failures
- Obstruction of emergency exits on a fast ferry
- Risk of food poisoning an offshore vessel
- Interference with lookout on river cruisers
- Concerns regarding access arrangements
- Fatigue concerns
- Promoting the safety role of manning agents
- Limiting the risk of fires caused by low pressure fuel leaks
- Assisting a Flag State accident investigation
- The need for Bridge Resource Management training after a near grounding
- Fire extinguishing systems
- Operating & maintenance manuals

Not everything the Programme is involved in is published; however, thirty reports have been reproduced in CHIRP’s Maritime FEEDBACK. This, our quarterly newsletter, is intended to reflect the scope of the programme’s interest and activities and serve as the main vehicle for raising awareness and generating further reports. To this end it has a hard copy circulation of one hundred and thirty thousand and is also widely circulated by e-mail.

The CHIRP web site has been developed significantly over the last twelve months and further improvements are planned.

These are encouraging beginnings, but there remains plenty of work to do. Whilst CHIRP has developed robust processes for dealing with reports modelled on the aviation programme, it also depends upon mutual understanding and trust in order to function effectively within its sector. These latter aspects have become increasingly difficult to develop in a world which often appears bent on seeking scapegoats instead of solutions. CHIRP will continue its efforts to raise awareness and understanding of its objectives and methods and encourage the maritime community to continue to value it and use it in the future.

Please report:
- When you are concerned to protect your identity (please note that anonymous reports are not accepted)
- When you wish others to benefit from an important 'Lesson Learned'
- When other reporting procedures are not appropriate or are not available
- When you have exhausted company/regulatory reporting procedures without the issue having been addressed

As usual we emphasise that reports are published only with the agreement of the reporter and are edited only to remove identifying text. They represent the safety concern(s) from the reporter's perspective, based on the information available to the reporter.
AN INVITATION TO MANNING AGENTS

The FIRE IN DRYDOCK report in MFB 1 raised a number of issues including the role of manning agencies in promoting seafarer safety.

CHIRP has been highlighting newly implemented UK regulations and draft international regulations which may impact manning agencies, employment businesses and job boards in order to encourage and promote industry dialogue.

CHIRP has received a response from one agency which contains a generous invitation to meet and discuss the application of the new regulations. The Maritime Advisory Board recommends that this invitation is accepted. In addition, CHIRP has written to the Department of Trade and Industry asking whether they would be willing to send a representative to such a meeting.

An extract is reproduced below with the invitation highlighted:

"Agencies have the potential to be the strongest or weakest link in the recruitment chain. Good agencies will always be at a commercial disadvantage to unscrupulous operators and it is difficult to see how agencies that have paid little regard to the existing regulations to date will pay any further attention to the new ones. In addition, the number of new agencies in a declining UK market makes it more difficult for the good ones to operate a viable business.

We would strongly support the reintroduction of licensing for any company engaged in the marine manning industry, including Jobs Boards, together with a public on-line register where companies and seafarers could verify this information. However, this should be applied internationally and operate independently of any other licensing systems in force in the relevant country, which is often subject to corruption. It would also be a good idea to limit the number of licensed agencies, according to the actual amount of work available in the country concerned and restrict agencies to recruiting in countries where they have a registered office. This would ensure that they understood the regulatory framework of that country, had access to essential resources and the language skills to discharge this function properly. It would also give seafarers greater protection, as the agency would be subject to any laws applying in their own country. Seafarers would also be discouraged from the practice of Spamming their CVs to agencies in other countries.

It would be useful to hear the views of other agencies on how best the industry can comply with these regulations. We have the use of a big meeting room at our business premises and would be happy to host a brain storming session if anyone is interested in travelling to our offices. Who knows, an Association of

Marine Recruitment Businesses may even evolve, as a result!"

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ACCIDENT/INCIDENT INVESTIGATION

This issue was raised by the report in MFB 2 as "Loss of Control, Loss of Ship..., Loss of Life."

CHIRP has established contact with the Flag Administration and receipt of the information supplied has been acknowledged. A preliminary investigation into the casualty had already been conducted and CHIRP is awaiting information with respect to the status of the final report.

CHIRP welcomes this positive response from a non-UK Flag Administration. The establishing of appropriate links such as this one can only assist CHIRP in furthering its objective of promoting maritime safety by supplying information that would not otherwise be available.

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ENGINE INTEGRATION ISSUES

First reported in MFB1 as “Integration of Non-marine Specific Components” and now the subject of one of CHIRP’s longest chains of correspondence! Whilst we are unable to report a conclusion at this point CHIRP can say that the dialogue is positive. This latest contribution comes from someone who sees rather too often the results of getting it wrong.

“I entirely agree that there are problems at the interface between the engine package and the vessel. There are so many different engine packages, all with different criteria; I think it will be very difficult to try to introduce some degree of uniformity and standards for the various on/off engine connections and couplings.

Even if this could be achieved, I think you would only have gone part of the way to preventing engine room fires. There are a myriad of different sources of oil or fuel escape which cause fires, and a lot of them are unforeseeable.

The common denominator is the ignition source. In nearly all cases of engine room fires, there is an escape of combustible liquid on to a hot spot. In my opinion, it should be easier to remove the hot spots than the potential sources of leakage. The numbers of hot spots are after all, relatively few.

There is the main engine exhaust system, perhaps the indicator cocks on some engines, and that is about it.

My ideal situation would be to change the class acceptance criteria so that all marine engines had water jacketed and cooled exhaust systems, up to the outlet flange of the turbocharger, as per some engines. This should be the standard that others have to follow. This would be easily done, requiring just a simple change of class acceptance criteria, and would require very little work by the engine manufacturer."

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SOLAS requires no hot surfaces over 220°C on new vessels, but this is not having any effect and we still see new vessels with hot spots and where the quality of lagging and insulation is poor and deteriorates in service, so the only answer in my opinion is to have water cooled exhaust systems.”

**CHIRP** is communicating these issues to the International Association of Classification Societies, a number of engine manufacturers’ associations and the underwriting community, to promote dialogue with respect to what improvements may be made to the information provided and the processes adopted that might promote the reliability of the engine/fuel system interface, based upon existing procedures and guidance.

The views expressed here will be included as they confirm the issue, but offer a different solution.

**CURRENT MAIB INVESTIGATIONS**

The following accidents/incidents are being investigated by the MAIB as at 8 July 2004:

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<tr>
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<td>Hoo Finch/Front VR</td>
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<td>Collision</td>
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<td>Dart 8</td>
<td>Accident to person</td>
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<tr>
<td>Barmouth Dory</td>
<td>Capsize resulting in loss of two crew members</td>
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<td>Kingfisher</td>
<td>Fire on board</td>
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<td>Star Clipper</td>
<td>Fatality</td>
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<td>Two fatalities and one accident to person</td>
<td>02/05/04</td>
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<td>Collision</td>
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**REPRODUCTION OF FEEDBACK**

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**MARITIME INCIDENT REPORT**

**NAME:**

**ADDRESS:**

**POST CODE:**

**TEL:**

**DO YOU HAVE A PREFERRED DATE AND/OR METHOD FOR CHIRP TO CONTACT YOU?:**

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1. THIS REPORT WILL ONLY BE SEEN BY CHIRP STAFF.
2. YOUR PERSONAL DETAILS ARE REQUIRED ONLY TO ENABLE US TO CONTACT YOU FOR FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT ANY PART OF YOUR REPORT.
3. YOU WILL RECEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.
4. THIS SECTION OF THE REPORT FORM WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU.

NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT. THE REPORT WILL NOT BE USED WITHOUT YOUR APPROVAL.

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**PLEASE COMPLETE THE RELEVANT INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION**

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**THE VESSEL**

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<td><strong>DIRECTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>MOORING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>YES</strong></td>
<td><strong>SHIEL HEIGHT</strong></td>
<td><strong>DEPARTURE/PILOTAGE</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NO</strong></td>
<td><strong>DIRECTION</strong></td>
<td><strong>LOADING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>NA</strong></td>
<td><strong>VISIBILITY</strong></td>
<td><strong>TRANSIT</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>FOG</strong></td>
<td><strong>RAIN</strong></td>
<td><strong>DISCHARGING</strong></td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td><strong>SNOW</strong></td>
<td></td>
<td></td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

**OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:**

- **NAME OF COMPANY:**
- **DESIGNATED PERSON ASHORE (OR CONTACT PERSON):**

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**ACCOUNT OF EVENT** — (PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EVENT, WHY IT RESULTED OR COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN INCIDENT AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO PREVENT IT HAPPENING AGAIN. PLEASE CONTINUE ON ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY)

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[Additional information on the CHIRP website: www.chirp.co.uk]