

# MARITIME FEEDBACK

Issue No: 16

Autumn 2007

## EDITORIAL

Following Mike Powell's return to industry earlier this year and pending the appointment of a new, permanent Director (Maritime), Mr Chris Rowsell has kindly agreed to assist the Trust with the management of the Maritime Programme.

Chris is a Master Mariner, who until two years ago held a number of senior management appointments within the Shell organisation, most recently as General Manager Shipping Standards, Shell International Trading and Shipping Co. Ltd. London. Chris will be working part-time with the Trust and his wide-ranging maritime expertise is a most welcome addition to this Programme.

Peter Tait

## INTERVENTION

In MARITIME FEEDBACK, we ensure the anonymity of the reporter by disidentifying the report. Sometimes the circumstances of a report may be so unusual that the identity of the reporter could still become known to his or her colleagues. In such a case, **CHIRP** may elect not to publish the report. Nevertheless there may be an important learning from the report, in which case we may comment on it in an editorial such as this.

Such is the case with a recent report involving a yacht where one of the crew members intervened with his/her colleagues to correct a potentially unsafe situation. If we are to enhance safety on board, we must be prepared to intervene when we see an unsafe situation developing. It is worth taking a few moments to think how we individually handle this. Perhaps ask one-self some questions:

- If I am intervening to correct an unsafe situation involving a more junior colleague, how do I explain the risks involved so that he or she applies the learning on future occasions? Or will he/she just feel that it was an unwarranted criticism and perhaps repeat the unsafe act on a future occasion when not being observed?
- How would I best intervene if the person involved in the unsafe act is more senior to me?

- How would I receive an intervention from a colleague? We suggest that it is important, especially if the person intervening is more junior, to thank them and say that he/she was correct to point out the unsafe situation. Be prepared to discuss the situation, the risks involved and the corrective actions.

I am pleased to have come on board the **CHIRP** organisation for a period of time to review the maritime reports, to follow them up and provide feedback to the individual reporters, and to share the information on hazardous incidents with seafarers and those involved in the sea via the MARITIME FEEDBACK.

Chris Rowsell

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**Number of Reports Received Since Last Issue: 22**

### Topics Have Included:

Incorrect Heading Shown on AIS  
Near Collision  
Engine Failure due to Fishing Net  
Life Rafts  
Contravention of Traffic Separation

MARITIME FEEDBACK is also available on the **CHIRP** website - [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)

A Maritime Safety Newsletter

from **CHIRP** the Confidential Hazardous Incident Reporting Programme

**CHIRP** Narrative: We continue to receive a significant number of reports of near collision incidents. The following are three examples:

#### ERRATIC ENCOUNTER

**Report Text:** Interestingly enough, the incident I would like to promulgate to your readers is nearly identical to that shown in diagram form on the front page of your Issue no. 14. vis. "near Collision-Sister Ships."

*Editor's note: The reporter goes on to describe how his vessel "A", a large cargo vessel, was passing an island in daylight in good weather. Vessel "B" was apparently bound for a harbour xxxxx on that island.*

The other vessel began to slowly wander across the bows of own vessel. Right ahead, back to stbd, ahead again, a bit to port etc. Over about 1 hour, the other vessel eventually settled up on a parallel course about 4 points on my STARBOARD bow. Even my lookout commented "What on earth is this bloke up to?"

All was revealed after about 30 minutes. Other vessel made a bold alteration of course to PORT this time, and settled up on a perfect 0.0' C.P.A., collision course, (I suppose he presumed he was now the stand-on vessel), distance about 3.5 miles.

It became awkward as I had fishing vessels to port. Against my better judgement I called him on VHF. He answered immediately, but all he would say was, "I maintain my course and speed to harbour xxxxx." Over and over again.

He refused to budge, and I honestly believe collision was imminent without drastic action on my part. When the distance had reduced to 0.9 NM and he was still making no attempt to avoid collision I rang slow ahead, put my man on the wheel, and took a round turn out to port. Own ship turns on a sixpence, so I was able to turn inside the fishing vessels to port. They were more than a little perturbed however, and my mouth was quite dry. It had been too close to disaster.

When we were both passed and clear I again called the Chief Officer of the other vessel on VHF and told him that he had not only placed both ships in danger, but had demonstrated careless navigation and sloppy seamanship. His answer? "I maintain my course and speed to harbour xxxxx."

**CHIRP** Comment: The reporter clearly felt annoyed at what he perceived as "careless navigation and sloppy seamanship" by ship B in the hours prior to the close quarters situation. It is a feature of maritime life that the actions of another vessel can sometimes be unexpected. For any of us involved in such a situation, it is useful with the benefit of hindsight to reflect on how this can be avoided on future occasions.

In respect of the incident itself, could action have been taken earlier to avoid the close quarters situation? The manoeuvring of ship B may not have

been in accordance with good practice, but nevertheless, at the point at which it altered course to port across the course of ship A when 3.5 miles away, would it not have been appropriate for ship A, as by then the give-way vessel, to have altered course to starboard or to have slowed down?

On a more general note, the report raises a number of issues regarding bridge management that are worthy of consideration if you are a Captain or expect to be so in the future. For example:

1. What guidance would you give in your standing orders on when you expect to be called?
2. Are your officers clear as to your requirements for being alerted if there is a potential close quarters situation with sea-room restricted, for example by fishing vessels?
3. How would you engender an environment on board in which the advice from the senior officers is perceived as constructive guidance rather than as a "bludgeoning?"

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#### A MISS TOO NEAR

**Report Text:** The incident happened on the very last day of my employment before signing-off. I was on board of the refrigerating vessel mv "AAA" as the Radio Officer. We were en-route from the Black Sea to the Eastern Mediterranean about 20 miles away from our destination.

The ferry - boat "#####" approached us on our port side. Then, for about 10 minutes we were sailing in the same direction with the same speed (16knots). The ferry boat's navigator then decided to increase the speed a bit, and then they crossed our bow very, very close to our vessel.

It is necessary to remember that there were almost 600 people on board the ferry; it was really criminal negligence. It could have become another mv "ADMIRAL NAKHIMOV" which sank next to the port of Novorossiysk after being hit by the cargo vessel "PETR VASIOV" on Aug. 31, 1986. More than 400 people died.



**CHIRP** Comment: The reporter has sent **CHIRP** this report 12 years after the event. Therefore it is not possible to follow it up. Nevertheless, it is a breath-

taking illustration of the risk involved in such an unnecessary an ill-considered manoeuvre.

It also offers the opportunity to highlight that **CHIRP** is pleased to receive photographs with reports.

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### ANXIETY FOR MOTOR YACHT

**Report Text:** Circumstances: -Daylight, wind SW F5-6, heading 010deg.(T), visibility excellent (>12nm), steep quartering sea from SW making handling difficult, speed 8 knots in troughs & 12 knots on waves.

Vessel/crew: -Twin screw motor yacht, 10 metres, well equipped with integrated radar/chart-plotter, VHF, radar reflector etc. Skipper 40 years experience, crew 10 years experience.

The incident: - Position approximately 2.25nm SSW from the Nab Tower, holding a steady course of 010(T).

We had been keeping a good lookout, watching shipping approaching and leaving the Nab deep water channel, the surrounding area, and crossing East-West.

One of the vessels was a large commercial vessel.. There were no vessels astern of us, & no other small craft in the area.

At 1610 what we later established to be the xxxxxx was on a reciprocal course 190(T) approx. She was clearly shaping to pass us port to port from the aspect presented visually. We did not plot a CPA, as the fact that she was going to pass well clear was evidenced by the radar range & bearing markers.

At 1618, when she was about ¼ mile away, bearing 20deg. on our port bow, she altered course about 40deg. to port across our bows, creating an immediate risk of collision. We immediately altered course 70deg. to port to place the other vessel on our starboard beam in accordance with Rule 17a(ii). Turning to starboard would, in the conditions, have meant lying beam onto the seas & leave us closer under her bow when we were unsure that she had seen us. This action removed the risk of collision & reduced our speed to 5 knots, though making handling even harder as we were now heading into the steep seas.

As she passed us we easily saw her name on her starboard bow with the naked eye. We called her on CH16. An officer replied promptly. I explained that we were the vessel across whose bows she had just turned, creating a risk of collision. He answered "so what's the problem?" In rather more detail I explained that she had altered course across our bows in contravention of the International Regulations for the Prevention of Collision at Sea, as he seemed unaware of these. Again he showed no recognition of the risk. I said that I would be reporting the incident. At this point he asked for our position, which I gave, commenting that he was also abusing his size and power. Following this I

terminated the exchange and recorded the incident in our vessel's log.

**CHIRP** Comment: This incident was reported to both **CHIRP** and the UK Marine Accident Investigation Branch (MAIB).

Unfortunately the date the reporter gave to both MAIB and **CHIRP** was wrong. The MAIB therefore spent some time establishing that there was no ferry in that vicinity. It then went back to the reporter, who corrected the date by one day. The MAIB then went back to the ferry company, whose account of distances and actions was different to the reporters. Unfortunately the time lapse meant that the ship's VDR data had been overwritten, so MAIB could not look at objective data.

Lessons from this incident include:

- A reminder for all seafarers that perception of safe distances may be very different between types of craft. For example, if you are on the bridge of a large vessel, passing close to a small boat may appear to you to pose no risk. However if you are on a small boat when a large vessel alters course towards you at close range and you do not know whether she has seen you, the situation may give considerable anxiety.
- Think about how your actions are perceived in the other vessel
- Report serious near misses to the Coastguard at the time
- If reporting to MAIB and/or **CHIRP**, please double-check the data.

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### WHO'S IN CHARGE? FURTHER COMMENT

**Report Text:** You gave the standard explanation per UK Sector of the North Sea and as the HSE regulations do not apply anywhere else, I thought the following might be interesting. The comments made are personal and not necessarily those of the company.

We had exactly this problem a few years ago regarding diamond mining off Africa.

Under the relevant National Law the Mine Manager is responsible for everything. They do not differentiate between onshore and offshore. Having canaries and helmets with safety lamps and mine rescue equipment on board was amusing.

Under International Law the Master {Northern European Flag} was responsible for everything.

It therefore appeared that the Master could go to prison for decisions made by the Mine Manager, without having any say in the matter and relations could be somewhat strained.

The compromise, which was accepted by everyone including the relevant Government was as follows:

- When the ship is moving or anchoring - the Master is in full charge.
- When anchored or Dynamically Positioned, the Mine Manager is in charge of mining operations BUT the safety of the ship and the personnel on board is the responsibility of the Master. The Master therefore retains effectively a veto over the Mine Manager where safety is involved.

**CHIRP** Comment: The **CHIRP** comment in MFB15 on the report "Who's in Charge Here" emphasised the importance of absolute clarity on lines of responsibility. This new report illustrates how this was achieved in an operation off Africa.

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### WAKE WASH

**Report text:** This is about particular ships which sail regularly into this port. Complaints have been made via the radio directly to the ships involved and by telephone to the harbour master and I believe by letter. The ships are both quite big ships for using the channel. The problem arises if they arrive or leave at low water, as they can set up a 3-4 foot wave which has washed people out of their dinghies and which will pick a boat up which may be just afloat or aground and throw the boat sideways with incredible force. I am talking about 20-30 ft boats. Some of the captains come through at a slow sensible speed and do not cause a problem. Other captains come through faster. Sooner or later someone is going to get washed overboard or get washed out of their dinghy and drown. There have been several instances. A letter came out from the harbour master warning people to wear life jackets because of this problem, but if it is possible for large vessels to navigate the channel on most occasions without causing a problem, why cannot this be the standard practice.

**CHIRP** Comment: **CHIRP** has corresponded with the Harbour Authority. The Authority is very aware of the issue and has provided feedback which we summarise as follows:

- The Authority has records of the passages of vessels passing various reporting positions. These indicate that in general vessels are maintaining a safe speed in the upper reaches of the river where the wash effect is at its greatest.
- All Masters are Pilotage Exemption Certificate holders and as part of their oral examination and as part of their practical assessment are tested on their understanding of this effect.
- In recent years with the advent of AIS the Authority can now obtain a direct readout of a vessels speed which is recorded onto hard drive. Masters and Pilots are aware of this and are even more unlikely to speed in the river.

- The rushing of water from the shallow bank of this river as a large ship passes can be very disturbing to other vessels. The effect is most pronounced at low water but there are other factors.
- The Authority has issued a local notice to mariners and a warning in the local yachting guide.

To **CHIRP**, the way forward appears to be:

- The Harbour Authority to continue to emphasise to Masters and Pilots the need to proceed at slow speed - monitor speeds of vessels and make visual checks on the effect of wash
- The owners of small craft to remain observant to the approach of large vessels and alert to the possibility of wash.
- The Harbour Authority to consider highlighting again the dangers of wash at low water by re-issuing and/or updating the relevant Notice to Mariners.
- People in small craft to consider wearing lifejackets at all times, as recommended by the RNLI.
- Harbour users to report any problems to the harbour Authority at the time of the occurrence or as soon after as possible.
- If a serious problem persists, a more fundamental review of the issues and mitigating measures may be required.

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### TEMPERATURE AND PRESSURE GAUGE CALIBRATION

**Report Text:** No pressure gauge and temperature gauge calibration kits found onboard. This is the first ship during my 6 years at sea that I've been on to a ship with no such calibration equipments onboard. As the importance of proper functioning of pressure and temperature gauges of working shipboard machineries cannot be overlooked, this proper functioning can only be ensured properly with the onboard availability of certified calibration kits. Though the ship was dry-docked this year and boiler survey was carried out but the boiler pressure gauge was not calibrated and no calibration certificate exists for such an important pressure vessel. You can imagine the disaster if such an equipment malfunctions. From the Engine Control Room (ECR) one cannot monitor critical parameters like boiler pressure and boiler water level, which if incorrect cannot give appropriate pre-warning to the watch-keeper before giving alarm or will go unnoticed if the alarm fails. According to me it is a very important parameter which should be able to be monitored from the ECR.

**CHIRP** Comment: There appears to be wide variation in how different Administrations mandate

the calibration of engine gauges. Indeed some may have no requirement for this.

Notwithstanding this, **CHIRP** believes that calibration of critical engine parameters is an essential practice within a proper maintenance programme and should be promoted as best practice.

Similarly, the ability to monitor critical engine parameters from an Engine Control Room (ECR) is fundamental to the purpose of an ECR and could be considered to be a safety critical element of the ECR design.

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### NEAR COLLISION

**CHIRP Narrative:** This report is from the Master of a supply vessel. He was acting as watch-keeper at the time of the incident.

**Report Text:** The following incident took place in the Northern North Sea earlier this year at about 0750 hrs(UTC+1). It involved the failure of the give way crossing vessel to make any move to carry his obligations under rule 15 such that the stand on vessel had to take all the avoiding action. At 0700 hrs the plot was started on both the 3cm & 9cm radars of the target at about 8 miles out about 4 points on the port bow. Both displays were north up, relative 12min vector, true 6 min trails. The weather was heavily overcast with visibility of 5 miles: the wind was out of the north at force 6 / 7 with a rough sea and a mod to rough swell running. Own vessel was on passage to the ### Oil Field on a course of 043deg T speed 9.8 kts The target data gave the information that within the hour a collision situation would exist and the AIS gave details of the vessel concerned. The plot showed that his cog was 135 with an sog of 7.8 kts leading to a CPA of between 0 and 0.2 cable in about 48 mins. The angle of convergence of the two vessels was very close to ninety degrees thus making it and maintaining it as a crossing situation throughout the whole event. The other vessel held her course and speed during the entire close encounter such that at 8 cables own vessel halved speed allowing the give way to pass ahead by 0.42 cables. The other vessel never deviated from her course or speed giving the distinct impression that for some reason she was totally unaware of our close presence in broad daylight. She continued on her way oblivious to all.

No VHF contact was made at any time. Both vessels displayed nav lights for power driven vessel underway and making way and nothing else.

**CHIRP Comment:** The other vessel appears to have contravened Rule 15 (Crossing Situation) of the Col Regs. We are communicating with the owner of the other vessel to invite his comment.

As with any close quarters situation, it is worth reflecting whether, as the stand-on vessel, we could have done anything differently. In this case, with the two vessels being within four cables of each other,

the tug may have been at some risk, albeit small, if the other vessel had unpredictably altered course at the last minute. So would it have been appropriate to slow down somewhat to increase the passing distance?

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### COLLISION REGULATIONS

**Report Text:** A large sail training vessel under sail on the port tack in position Lat 49 57.8N long 001 56.8W bound from Cherbourg to Swanage steering 005 at 5-6 knots variable with wind speed. Navigation lights and AIS were configured correctly. At 2020 bst a power-driven vessel "XXX" was observed visually and by radar close to the port beam with a CPA of zero in 30 min. at range six miles. This was confirmed by AIS.

After monitoring the situation for several minutes I became concerned that XXX was not apparently taking any avoiding action. I spoke with the vessel on VHF Ch6 and explained our status as a sailing vessel. The OOW on XXX asked me what action I required of him. I asked him to take action that would result in him passing clear of my vessel and preferably astern. XXX became quite excited and admonished me for asking him to take action at such an early stage. He stated that he was "under orders", a "commercial vessel", that my vessel was a "leisure vessel" and he further stated that he did not wish to "waste fuel" and that he would close to two miles before taking action. I spoke again with XXX and reminded him of the requirement to take "early substantial action to avoid a close quarters situation", I further informed him that we were a low speed sailing vessel with consequent lack of manoeuvrability and that he was deliberately contravening the International Collision Regulations. The VHF fell silent and XXX stood on. Our engines were on instant notice. I called XXX again on Ch 16 and we spoke on CH 6. Again XXX asked me what action I required of him. I again asked him to alter course to pass clear astern and added that I was going to report the incident. XXX then altered course and passed 1.4 nm astern of us. Shortly after this incident I reported to Solent Coastguard by VHF, XXX had obviously monitored my conversation with Solent and called them himself soon after. XXX launched a further verbal assault referring to commercial superiority, excess fuel consumption and added again that two miles was a perfectly safe distance at which to take avoiding action.

I am concerned as to whether XXX intended to take avoiding action at all and, of course, his judgement in stating that closing to two miles should not cause concern to the stand-on vessel.

**CHIRP Comment:** Just as "road-rage" is a problem with land transport, the statements from the other vessel may be an unfortunate example of "sea-rage". It should go without saying that the international regulations for preventing collisions at sea contain no reference to "commercial superiority". Rule 16 does state that "every vessel which is directed to keep out

of the way of another vessel shall, so far as possible, take early and substantial action to keep well clear.”

In this case, if the give-way vessel had taken early action, rather than waiting until two miles distant from the sailing vessel, he would have given a positive indication of his intention and avoided the tension generated by the VHF communication.

As a general comment, it is worth remembering when using the VHF that we have a wide audience so our comments should be calm and professional.

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### COLLISION REGULATIONS - NEAR MISS

**Report Text:** My vessel was proceeding in the NE lane of the Dover Straits traffic separation scheme on a course of 046 (T), speed 11 kts, approx 4' from the MPC buoy. My intention was to pass the MPC buoy and cross the SW bound lane, bound for Immingham

The vessel XXX was noted on my port side proceeding across the Traffic Separation scheme from the Dover side with a CPA of 0.5'.

As the XXX was making no attempt to avoid a close quarters situation I attempted to contact him on VHF channels 11, 13 and 16 but he refused to answer, attempts by Gris Nez Traffic to contact him on channel 11 also met with no success.

Following this I decided to reduce my speed just in case of any further problems as I felt that a 0.5' crossing of my bow was not sufficient and he eventually passed across my bow at just over 0.7'.

Gris Nez Traffic finally made contact with him after he was across and clear of me and I managed to speak to him myself shortly after, when asked why he was not following the Collision Regulations the call was cut off and he refused to answer.

A formal complaint has been lodged with Gris Nez Traffic.

There was no reason for what this ship did as there was no traffic behind me other than the fact that a bow crossing of 0.5' was the normal practice for this ship.

**CHIRP Comment:** There is a traditional saying that a miss is as good as a mile. This is not a philosophy to which we subscribe as it takes no account of the risk involved. In this case, when the OOW of the give-way vessel decided to pass 0.5 mile ahead of the stand-on vessel, did he give any thought to the consequence of an engine failure on his own ship ?

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### IN THE WRONG LANE

**Report Text:** Report of vessel 'AAA' observed contravening the Strait Of Hormuz Traffic Separation Scheme by proceeding against the general direction of traffic flow; August 2007. Attached is a video playback from our vessel's ECDIS and additionally screenshots showing greater detail. The vessel's

details were obtained from her AIS @ 20:45 (All times quoted are GMT) and are as follows:

Vessel Name: #####

MMSI: #####

Call Sign: #####

Destination: BHARAIN

Length: 78m

Breadth: 13m

Draft: 4.0m

SOG: 7.7Kts

COG: 240°

Status: Underway Using Engines

Latitude: 26° 32.6N

Longitude: 056° 29.1E

The times shown on the ECDIS Playback are GMT, shown bottom left. Vector lengths are 12 minutes.

The vessel was seen to be exhibiting the lights for a power driven vessel (2 masthead lights, sidelights and a stern light) and in addition 2 all round red lights on the main mast were observed.

**CHIRP Comment:** The reporter kindly sent us a CD with a recording showing the westerly track of the other vessel in the east-bound traffic lane off Hormuz. Given that the vessel appeared to be capable of steering courses around Hormuz, albeit in the wrong traffic lane, it is difficult to believe that she was justified in showing the two red lights prescribed by Rule 27 for vessels not under command or restricted in their ability to manoeuvre. We are contacting the Flag State of the other vessel.

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### A SUCCESSFUL OUTCOME

**CHIRP Narrative:** In a previous report in 2005, a pilot had advised as follows:

**Report Text:** Some radars, although type tested have a severe navigational limitation that I have observed, which I wish to bring to your attention.

I encounter a wide range of radars with very little opportunity to familiarise myself with their operation before I am using them in earnest. I receive regular radar updating training and know what I want a radar to do, but increasingly, I am unable to do so due the complexity of different knobs and menus that are used by all the various radar manufacturers.

I have over the years noted that there is a specific problem on a particular type of radar that I have encountered.

Navigating in my pilotage district, it is quite normal to pass a cable or two off prominent landmarks that are ideal for parallel indexing. One example requires passing a PI landmark at 2.2 cables and altering course at over 2 miles to pass this landmark. I therefore require at least a 3 miles range with a PI set up to pass at 2.2 cables. The particular radar has a limitation of not being able to bring the PI Line

closer than the inner range ring i.e. 0.5 mile on the 3 miles range. This is not adequate for the above example – it is only on the 0.75 mile range or less that I can set a PI of 2.2 cables – but my alteration of course is at least 2 miles from my chosen landmark!

**CHIRP** Comment: **CHIRP** liaised with industry groups to follow this up.

We were pleased to receive recently a follow-up report from the pilot . He wrote "I am pleased to report that having recently piloted a new ship fitted with xxx radars, the situation with parallel indexing has been vastly improved. The PI lines now have a minimum range of half the inner most range ring, whereas you recall it was previously the inner most range ring.....It took time but something appears to have fed through, thanks for your efforts."

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### INTERVENING FOR SAFETY

**Report Text:** I was asked by a friend of many years standing to join him and others to transfer his yacht to a new base some days away. The trip was uneventful, but the only jarring feature was the presence of two Life Buoy Lights which spent the entire trip hanging in the saloon. I did comment on the point during the first evening ("Should those things not be attached to the lifebuoys for the crossing?") but without any acknowledgement. I probably should have been more forceful about this, but as the 'junior boy' I did not want to push the point.

However it might be worth reiterating the point that safety equipment in its shore stowage might as well be ashore.

**CHIRP** Comment: **Thanks to the reporter for raising this. Although the non-conformity could easily be rectified by moving the lights to their proper positions, it does highlight some general challenges to improving safety at sea whether we are on a yacht or a large ship:**

1. Do we comply with safety rules and best practice? Having the lifebuoy lights hanging in the saloon does not represent best practice!!!
2. Are we developing a safety culture in which everyone is aware of hazards and thinks about the precautions to mitigate the risks? In this case, what was the precaution had someone fallen over-board at night?
3. As individuals, do we intervene if we see a hazard or unsafe situation? The reporter recognises this - "I probably should have been more forceful about this". This takes us neatly back to the editorial on page 1!!!

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### BACK ISSUES

Back issues of MARITIME FEEDBACK are available on our website: [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)

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## PUBLISHED REPORTS

Reports are published only with the agreement of the reporter and are, as far as possible, in their own words, edited only to remove identifying text. The safety concern(s) raised are based on the information provided by the reporter and therefore represent the reporter's perspective.

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The MCA's 24hr Info No. is 0870 6006505.  
(Hazardous incidents may be reported to your local Coastguard Station.)

MAIB reports and incident report forms are available on their website [www.maib.gov.uk](http://www.maib.gov.uk) and their 24 hr tel. no. is 02380 232527

# CHIRP

## MARITIME REPORT FORM

**CHIRP** is entirely independent of any other organisation involved in the maritime sector, whether regulatory, operational, manufacturer or supplier.

NAME: _____ ADDRESS: _____ POST CODE: _____ TEL: _____ DO YOU HAVE A PREFERRED DATE AND/OR METHOD FOR CHIRP TO CONTACT YOU?:-	1. THIS REPORT WILL ONLY BE SEEN BY CHIRP STAFF. 2. YOUR PERSONAL DETAILS ARE REQUIRED ONLY TO ENABLE US TO CONTACT YOU FOR FURTHER DETAILS ABOUT ANY PART OF YOUR REPORT. 3. YOU WILL RECEIVE AN ACKNOWLEDGEMENT AS SOON AS POSSIBLE. 4. THIS REPORT FORM WILL BE RETURNED TO YOU OR DESTROYED. <p style="text-align: center;"><b>NO RECORD OF YOUR NAME AND ADDRESS WILL BE KEPT. THE REPORT WILL NOT BE USED WITHOUT YOUR APPROVAL.</b></p>
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PLEASE COMPLETE THE **RELEVANT** INFORMATION ABOUT THE EVENT/SITUATION

YOURSELF - CREW POSITION			THE INCIDENT			
MASTER <input type="checkbox"/>	NAVIGATING OFFICER <input type="checkbox"/>		DATE OF OCCURRENCE		TIME	(LOCAL/GMT)
CHIEF ENGINEER <input type="checkbox"/>	ENGINEER OFFICER <input type="checkbox"/>		LOCATION:			
DECK RATING <input type="checkbox"/>	ENGINE RATING <input type="checkbox"/>		AT SEA <input type="checkbox"/>		DAY <input type="checkbox"/>	NIGHT <input type="checkbox"/>
CATERING <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (HOTEL, ETC) <input type="checkbox"/>		IN PORT <input type="checkbox"/>		HOURS ON DUTY BEFORE INCIDENT (IN PREVIOUS 24 HRS)	
THE VESSEL			TYPE OF VOYAGE		TYPE OF OPERATION	
TYPE (TANKER, BULK CARRIER, PASSENGER, ETC)			OCEAN PASSAGE <input type="checkbox"/>	COASTAL <input type="checkbox"/>	COMMERCIAL TRANSPORT <input type="checkbox"/>	OFFSHORE <input type="checkbox"/>
YEAR OF BUILD / GT			INLAND WATERWAY <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER <input type="checkbox"/>	FISHING <input type="checkbox"/>	LEISURE <input type="checkbox"/>
FLAG / CLASS						
EXPERIENCE / QUALIFICATION			WEATHER		VOYAGE PHASE	
TOTAL YEARS		YRS	WIND FORCE	DIRECTION	PRE-DEPARTURE <input type="checkbox"/>	ARRIVAL/PILOTAGE <input type="checkbox"/>
YEARS ON TYPE		YRS	SEA HEIGHT	DIRECTION	UNMOORING <input type="checkbox"/>	MOORING <input type="checkbox"/>
CERTIFICATE GRADE			SWELL HEIGHT	DIRECTION	DEPARTURE/PILOTAGE <input type="checkbox"/>	LOADING <input type="checkbox"/>
PEC <input type="checkbox"/> Yes <input type="checkbox"/> No <input type="checkbox"/> NA			VISIBILITY	RAIN <input type="checkbox"/>	TRANSIT <input type="checkbox"/>	DISCHARGING <input type="checkbox"/>
OTHER QUALIFICATIONS:			FOG <input type="checkbox"/>	SNOW <input type="checkbox"/>	PRE-ARRIVAL <input type="checkbox"/>	OTHER (SPECIFY IN TEXT) <input type="checkbox"/>
THE COMPANY						
NAME OF COMPANY:					TEL:	
DESIGNATED PERSON ASHORE (OR CONTACT PERSON)					FAX:	

**ACCOUNT OF EVENT** - (PLEASE DESCRIBE THE EVENT, WHY IT RESULTED OR COULD HAVE RESULTED IN AN INCIDENT AND WHAT MIGHT BE DONE TO PREVENT IT HAPPENING AGAIN. PLEASE CONTINUE ON ADDITIONAL SHEETS IF NECESSARY)



PLEASE PLACE THE COMPLETED REPORT FORM, WITH ADDITIONAL PAGES IF REQUIRED, IN A SEALED ENVELOPE (no stamp required) AND SEND TO:

**CHIRP • FREEPOST (G13439) • Building Y20E • Room G15 • Cody Technology Park • Ively Road • Farnborough • Hampshire • GU14 0BR • UK**

Confidential Tel (24 hrs): +44 (0) 1252 393348 or **Freefone** (UK only) 0808 100 3237 and Confidential Fax: +44 (0) 1252 394290

For e-mail reports first apply for a security certificate to [confidential@chirp.co.uk](mailto:confidential@chirp.co.uk) with "Certificate" in subject line only; submit no other information.

Report forms are also available on the CHIRP website: [www.chirp.co.uk](http://www.chirp.co.uk)